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1 Introduction 
Abstract 
In October 2003, the European Union introduced a Directive which widens the scope of the 
EU’s minimum taxation system from mineral oils to all energy products including coal, natu-
ral gas and electricity. It aims at reducing distortions that currently exist between Member 
States as well as between energy products. In addition, it increases previous minimum tax 
rates and thus the incentive to use energy more efficiently. The Directive will lead to changes 
in the energy tax schemes in a number of countries, in particular some southern Member 
Countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and most of the Eastern European EU candidate coun-
tries.  
In this paper, we analyze the effects of the EU energy tax harmonization with GTAP-E, a 
computable general equilibrium model. Particular focus is placed on the Eastern European 
countries which became new members of the EU in May 2004. We investigate the effects of 
the tax harmonization on overall economic growth and sectoral development. Special atten-
tion is paid to international trade in order to analyze if competitiveness concerns which have 
been forwarded in the context of energy taxation are valid. Furthermore, the effect on energy 
consumption and emissions and thus the contribution to the EU’s climate change targets is 
analyzed. 
JEL classification: C680, F180, H230, O520, Q480 
1 Introduction   
In October 2003, the European Union introduced a Directive restructuring the Community 
framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (2003/96/EC). It widens the 
scope of the EU’s previous minimum tax rate system from mineral oils to all energy products 
(including coal, natural gas and electricity) and increases the rates of previously existing 
minimum tax taxes. It thus aims at reducing distortions that currently exist between Member 
States and between mineral oils and the other energy products which up to now have not been 
subject to EU tax legislation. The Directive is considered an essential requirement for both the 
proper functioning of the internal market and the coherence of energy, transport and environ-
ment policies in Europe.  
The Directive is the result of a series of attempts to establish a comprehensive and more strin-
gent system of energy taxation in Europe. In 1992, a Community system for taxing mineral 
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oils was established by two Directives. One dealt with the harmonization of the structure of 
excise duties on mineral oils (92/81/EEC) while the other focussed on the approximation of 
the rates of excise duties on mineral oils (92/82/EEC). This system, however, was far from a 
full harmonization of oil taxation. Authorized by the Council, Member States introduced 
numerous exemptions or reductions for specific policy considerations, adding up to more than 
one hundred special provisions in the 15 Member States.  
The attempt to introduce a European CO2/energy tax which was launched in 1992 
(COM/92/226 FINAL) met strong resistance from several Member States. Since tax issues 
have to be decided unanimously in the EU, the attempt was first revised (COM/95/172 FINAL)  
and finally given up. Subsequently, the European Commission presented a proposal for a 
taxation framework of energy products (including coal and gas) and electricity in 1997. After 
a long process of discussion and modification of this proposal the Council of the European 
Union finally adopted the Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Com-
munity framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity. The Directive is sub-
stantially less stringent than the 1997 proposal. It gives minimum tax rates to comply with by 
January 2004 for various fuel types and electricity depending on whether it is used as a fuel, 
for industrial or commercial purposes or for heating. For a number of energy products and for 
electricity, minimum rates will be increased again by January 2010. The Directive includes 
various general and Member specific exemptions and transitional periods. In addition, an 
amendment was adopted as of April 2004 by the EU’s Council of Ministers that allows the 
EU accession countries temporarily to apply country specific exemptions or lower rates of 
excise duty.2 The exemptions may last no longer than 2012.  
Following the Commission’s presentation of the new tax proposal in 1997, a number of stud-
ies were conducted to analyze its economic and environmental effects (e.g. Barker, 1998; 
Kouvaritakis 2003; Klok 2002; Heady 2000). Jansen and Klaassen (2000) use three EU-wide 
top-down simulation models to study the macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of the 1997 
proposal. They focus on the double dividend debate3 and analyze the effects of different ways 
                                                                          
2 The EU accession countries, in the following also referred to as new EU Member States, EU+10 or new Eastern 
European EU Member Countries, include: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. EU15 relates to the 15 (old) European Union Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. EU25 
corresponds to the sum of both, i.e. to all EU Member Countries as of May 1
st 2004. 
3 The double dividend hypothesis stipulates that by using the additional revenue from environmental taxes to 
reduce existing distortions of the tax system welfare gains or other benefits could be reaped in addition to the 
reduction of environmental externalities.  Cf. Goulder (1995). 
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of allocating tax revenues in order to understand whether (and if so how) a double dividend 
can be obtained. All models in the analysis confirm that the proposal will have positive mac-
roeconomic impacts if the tax revenues are recycled by reducing social security contributions 
paid by employers. GDP and employment are expected to be higher and CO2 emissions lower 
in almost all Member States. Sectoral impacts are modest, the energy sector is expected to 
suffer the most. The models show significant differences in their results which are mainly due 
to the model types, country coverage, and the way tax exemptions are handled.  
The study by Heady et al. (2000) uses a bottom-up engineering approach for calculating the 
effects of the proposed tax. CO2 abatement cost curves (or CO2 savings supply curves in their 
terminology) are estimated to analyze the impact of energy taxes on energy and CO2 savings. 
The model further calculates the cost-effective investments necessary to achieve the CO2 
savings and the effects on employment. The results of this model reveal the same direction of 
the effects as the top-down models and support the double–dividend hypothesis. The results 
range in the upper end of the scale compared to the top down model results. 
None of those studies, however, investigate the effects of the final directive. In this paper, we 
go beyond those studies in analyzing the effects of the EU Directive on tax harmonization as 
actually put into force in January 2004. We compare the effects with those that would have 
resulted from the more stringent 1997 proposal. We pay special attention to environmental 
and trade effects in those countries where substantial changes in the tax schemes are required, 
in particular the new Eastern European EU member countries but also some southern member 
countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal). We make use of the most recent GTAP data set which 
includes detailed sectoral data on Eastern European countries. Using a 13 sector, 12 region 
aggregation of the GTAP-E model, we simulate three policy scenarios to investigate the com-
parative static effects of the tax harmonization on economic growth, energy consumption and 
emissions, as well as on international trade 
The paper is organized as follows. We first provide a brief overview of the main features of 
the new EU Directive on energy tax harmonization. This following, we introduce the model-
ing framework and discuss the underlying data. In the consecutive section, we present the 
model scenarios and a discussion of the results. The last section summarizes the analysis and 
concludes the paper.  
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2  The EU Directive on Energy Taxation 
This section summarizes the Directive 2003/96/EC for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity. Table 1 outlines the minimum levels of taxation according to the Directive. The 
main characteristics of the Directive are described in the following.  
Energy products are taxed if they are used as fuel or for heating, but not if used for other 
purposes (raw materials, chemical reductions or in electrolytic or metallurgical proc-











Crude oil is not subject to taxation.   
Electricity input is taxed, not so however energy carriers as input to electricity genera-
tion. 
Energy inputs to district heating are not taxed, while energy inputs for heat generation 
are taxed. 
Energy use for certain industrial or commercial purposes is subject to reduced minimum 
tax rates, in particular in stationary engines and for agricultural purposes, compared to 
the taxation levels applicable to fuel used in motor cars. 
Specific provisions apply to the taxation of commercial diesel in order to mitigate the 
effects on competitiveness for road hauliers. Moreover, the Directive allows to apply 
higher tax rates for the non-commercial use of diesel and thus to reduce the existing gap 
between diesel and gasoline tax rates in this user category.  
Lower tax rates on business than on non-business use are possible. 
Many other exemptions and tax reductions are permitted as long as they are not detri-
mental to the proper functioning of the Internal Market and will not result in distortions 
of competition. 
Energy products used for air navigation or maritime transport within Community waters 
are exempt. However, domestic flights and flights between Member States which en-
tered into a pertinent bilateral agreement may be taxed. 
Renewable energy sources, energy used for combined heat and power generation (CHP) 
and CHP-electricity, as well as energy used for the carriage of goods and passengers by 
train, metro, tram or trolleybus may be exempt from the tax. 
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The tax burden on energy intensive firms (with energy costs of at least 3 % of the pro-





Taxes may be reduced for firms that have entered into commitments to reduce CO2 
emissions or where tradable permit schemes are implemented (down to zero in the case 
of energy-intensive businesses and down to 50% in the case of other businesses).  
Furthermore, the Directive includes a series of general and Member specific transitional 
periods (article 18, Annex II, and Amendment as of April 2004). Member States with 
difficulties in implementing the new minimum levels of taxation will be allowed a tran-
sitional period until 1 January 2007, particularly in order to avoid jeopardizing price 
stability, provided that this does not significantly distort competition. 
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Table 1  
Minimum levels of taxation according to Directive 2003/96/EC 



















Leaded petrol  1000 l  421  421  -  -  - 
Unleaded petrol  1000 l  359  359  -  -  - 
Gas oil  1000 l  302  330  21  21  21 
Kerosene 1000  l  302  330 21  0  0 
Heavy fuel oil  1000 kg  -  -  -  15  15 
LPG 1000  kg  125  125  41  0  0 
Natural gas  GJ gcv  2,6  2,6  0,3  0,3  0,15 
Coal, coke  GJ gcv  -  -  -  0,3  0,15 
Electricity MWh  -  -  -  1  0,5 
gcv – gross calorific value 
Source: Directive 2003/96/EC, European Commission. 
 
A comparison of the new minimum and the actual taxation (Table 2) reveals that in the 15 old 
Member States in many cases no or only small changes will be necessary to fulfill the Direc-
tive. Even if one disregards possible exemptions and reduced rates in the transition period, the 
necessary tax changes in most cases are not very significant except for Greece. In fact, tax 
rates in some countries are already substantially higher than the new minimum taxes.  
Table 2  








2004/10 AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK CZ HU PL SI
Unleaded Petrol 1000 l 500 359 414 507 548 559 581 624 296 401 542 372 628 470 396 504 729 351 409 381 276
Diesel  (Transp.) 1000 l 393 302/330 290 304 370 304 383 440 245 304 403 253 344 269 294 341 729 264 336 255 276
LFO 1000 l 39 21 76 13 279 68 49 61 166 47 403 5 198 33 85 279 50 0 0 42 0
H e a v y  f u e l  o i l 1 0 0 0  k g3 4 1 5 3 6 6 5 2 5 7 1 9 1 8 1 9 1 4 3 1 6 3 2 2 7 1 4 . . 4 40000
N a t .  G a s G J  g c v0 , 7 0 , 3  a ) 1 , 0 0 , 3 7 , 2 0 , 5 0 1 , 0 0 0 4 , 3 0 2 , 5 0 0 4 , 5 00000
C o a l ,  c o k e G J  g c v0 , 7 0 , 3  a ) 0 0 7 , 3 2 , 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 1 0 00000
Electricity MWh 3 1 b) 20 1,4 89 7,0 7,3 17,9 0 0 40 2,4 45 0 5,1 22 0 0 0 0 0,3
a) 0,15 euro for business use; b) 0,5 euro for business use; all taxes without sulphur tax and VAT; .. - data not available
White fields indicate that actual taxes are less than minimum taxes.
Sources: IEA 2003, BMU Umwelt 2003, EC 2003
Actual taxation in member states (2002)
 
However, in the new Member States actual tax rates are often lower than the new minimum 
taxation. For example taxation of gas oil (diesel) is below the 2004 level in 8 of the 10 and 
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below the 2010 level in all new Member States (Figure 1). In some cases, there is even a huge 
gap between actual taxation levels and the former minimum levels (in force since 1993). 





































3  CGE Modeling Framework and Data Issues  
3.1 Modeling  Framework 
The simulation of the economic and environmental impacts of the Directive is undertaken 
with the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model GTAP-E as described in Burniaux and 
Truong (2002). GTAP-E is a modified version of the static global trade model GTAP (Hertel 
1997). In its standard form, the GTAP model assumes perfect competition and constant re-
turns to scale in production. Production is modeled with the help of a nested production tree, 
allowing for CES-substitutability in most nests, but assuming fixed coefficients for value 
added and intermediate inputs. Labor is mobile within every region, but immobile between 
regions. The capital stock in each country is fixed, the allocation to the sectors of production 
flexible. All factors of production are fully employed.  
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GTAP-E has been designed to analyze issues of energy and climate change policy. It differs 
from the standard GTAP model mainly with respect to the representation of the production 
structure and by accounting for absolute quantities of energy use and CO2 emissions. The 
production nesting is changed in order to allow for substitution between energy and other 
factors of production (see Figure 2). The top level of the production tree specifies a fixed-
coefficient combination of labor, non-energy intermediate inputs and a “value added-Energy” 
aggregate. The latter is broken down in the subsequent nest into natural resources, land, labor 
and a capital-energy composite. The capital-energy composite is made up by capital and an 
energy composite. The energy aggregate consists of electric and non-electric energy. In the 
bottom level nest, non-electric energy is modeled as a combination of oil, gas and petroleum 
products. All nests except the top level are specified as CES functions. 
Public and private consumption as well as private savings are modeled as the outcome of the 
optimizing behavior of a “regional household” combining private households and the gov-
ernment. Regional household income consists of returns to primary factors and net taxes. 
Total regional income is allocated to government spending, private consumption and private 
savings by a Cobb-Douglas function, i.e. all three components obtain a (roughly) fixed share 
of regional income.4 Government expenditure is allocated to specific commodities in subse-
quent CES nests. Private spending is broken down into an energy and non-energy composite 
by a CDE (Constant Difference of Elasticity) function, and are further decomposed in their 
components in subsequent CES nests. The choice between domestic and imported goods in 
consumption as well as production and the subsequent bilateral trade flows are modeled using 
the Armington assumption, specifying that domestic and imported commodities are imperfect 
substitutes. Household savings can finance either domestic or foreign investment. 
 
                                                                          
4 The shares are not exactly constant, because the use of non-homothetic CDE (Constant Difference of Elasticity) 
functions on the lower level can entail minor changes (McDougall 2003). 
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Figure 2  





























3.2 Data  Issues 
The analysis makes use of the most recent GTAP data set (version 5.4) which for the first 
time includes detailed sectoral data for Eastern European countries. We aggregate the data in 
a way that allows us to investigate those countries/regions and sectors for which we expect 
the effects to be the largest while at the same time keeping the number of sectors and coun-
tries at a manageable level. The 13 sector aggregation as shown in Table 3 puts emphasis on 
energy intensive as well as energy producing industries which will be immediately affected 
by the new Directive. Moreover, the level of aggregation allows to investigate secondary 
growth and trade effects by separating non-energy intensive manufacturing into a group of 
labor intensive and a group of capital intensive products. The 12 regions individually cover 
the four largest EU15 member countries (DEU, FRA, GBR, ITA), three main EU accession 
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countries (POL, CZE, HUN), a group of southern EU15 countries (EUS) and aggregates for i) 
the rest of Eastern European accession countries (XAC), ii) the rest of the EU15 Member 
States (XEU), the rest of OECD countries (XOECD), and the rest of the world (ROW). 
Table 3  
Sectoral Aggregation 
Sectors   
1  AGR  agriculture, forestry, fishing, food, beverages, tobacco 
2 COL  coal   
3 OIL  crude  oil 
4  GAS  natural gas, gas manufacture, distribution 
5 p_c  petroleum products, coal products 
6 ely  electricity 
7  TCL  textiles, clothing, etc. (labor intensive, non energy intens. manuf.) 
8  M_E  machinery and equipment (capital intensive, non energy intens. manuf.) 
9  MIN  non metallic minerals and products (energy intensive manufacturing) 
10  MET  primary metals and metal products (energy intensive manufacturing) 
11 OEIM other energy intensive manufacturing (pulp and paper products, water) 
12  T_T  trade and transport services 
13 SER  other  services 
 
The EU Directive gives minimum taxes as specific taxes, i.e. in the form of Euro per physical 
quantity of energy. As excise taxes in GTAP-E are modeled as ad valorem taxes, tax rates 
need to be converted in order to serve as an input to the model. We use information on current 
energy prices and excise taxes (IEA 2003) to calculate the (ex ante) gross price increase (% ad 
valorem) needed to comply with the Directives minimum tax.5  
According to the EU Directive, different tax rates apply to i) gas oil used as motor fuels and 
used for heating purposes, and to ii) natural gas, coal and coke, and electricity used for com-
mercial and non-commercial purposes. Since gas oil, gasoline, heavy and light fuel oil etc. are 
all aggregated into the GTAP category p_c (petroleum products) we carry out several adjust-
ments to account for the differing tax rates within this category. Firstly, we compose tax ta-
bles for industrial (commercial users) and for private consumption (non-commercial energy 
users). Secondly, we use energy consumption data for mineral oil products (EUROSTAT 
2003) to calculate the share of each fuel type within the petroleum product category, separated 
                                                                          
5 Specifically, the gross price increase (in %) is calculated as the difference of the EU directive’s minimum tax and 
the current excise tax in relation to the current gross price (net price plus excise tax) for each energy product. 
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by industry and household. We allocate the use of transport-related petroleum products to 
industry and household, based on the assumption that about 95% of gasoline (leaded and 
unleaded petrol) and 25% of road-transport related diesel is consumed for transportation pur-
poses in the household sector.6 The remaining part, i.e. 5% of gasoline and 75% of road trans-
port related diesel is used within the industrial sector. The shares for each fuel type within the 
petroleum products category are then used to arrive at a weighted average tax increase for 
aggregated petroleum products for each country needed to comply with the Directive. This 
approach moves ahead from those applied in other studies, such as Kouvaritakis et al. (2003), 
Jansen/Klaassen (2000) or the original GTAP data base approach which simply allocates 50% 
of transport related energy consumption to households (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  
It is impossible to account for all industry and country specific exemptions due to the degree 
of aggregation in the CGE model and data problems. Nevertheless, we account for two impor-
tant exemptions. Firstly, own energy use in energy producing sectors is not taxed. Secondly, 
energy inputs to electricity production are not taxed.7   
3.3 Implementation  of Policy Scenarios 
Since the Directive sets minimum tax rates at a level below current tax rates in many Member 
States, there are ambiguities as to the effect of the Directive. This gives rise to two stylized 
policy scenarios:  
a.  Scenario MTH (minimum tax harmonization): In the first scenario we assume that Mem-
ber States fulfill the minimum tax rates as set by the Directive. Countries whose tax rates 
are higher than the minimum tax hold their tax rates at the higher level. This will lead to 
partial harmonization of the tax rates, only. 
b.  Scenario FTH (full harmonization on the level of minimum taxes): The second scenario is 
based on the assumption that Member States with higher tax rates lower their taxes to the 
                                                                          
(Min. EU tax – current excise tax)/gross price with gross price = net price + excise tax. Thus, a negative sign 
means the actual tax is higher than the minimum tax. 
6 This assumption is supported by a German household survey conducted in 2004 which revealed similar shares 
(Fh-ISI Karlsruhe et al. 2004). 
7 Moreover, in calculating ad valorem taxes based on the average energy price for industry, we indirectly account 
for exemptions for energy intensive industries. Highly energy intensive industries usually pay lower unit prices of 
energy than other industries. A quantity tax as given in the Directive would thus imply a higher ad valorem tax rate 
for energy intensive industries. The average industry ad valorem tax increase we calculate tends to underestimate 
those rates and thus come closer to the reduced rates energy intensive industries need to comply with. 
 11Discussion Papers 462 
3 CGE Modeling Framework and Data Issues 
minimum level. While it may be unlikely that countries actually reduce their taxes based 
on the new Directive, it shows how far beyond the minimum tax some of the energy prod-
ucts in some countries or regions are currently taxed. Analyzing this scenario provides an 
insight as to what level of minimum taxes would be necessary if the EU strived for a full 
harmonization of taxes, or if all EU Member States applied just the minimum tax rates in 
order to avoid competitive disadvantages. Furthermore, it shows what efficiency gains can 
be obtained by reducing distortions from different tax rates within the EU. 
Additionally, we consider a third scenario which reflects the earlier, more demanding pro-
posal for a Directive in order to analyze if the watered-down current Directive is justified on 
economic grounds: 
c.  Scenario MTH97 (minimum tax harmonization on levels proposed in 1997): In this sce-
nario, Member States fulfill minimum taxation according to the Commission’s tax pro-
posal in 1997 and hold their tax rates constant if they are higher (partial harmonization). 
The degree of harmonization can be measured by the standard deviation related to the mean 
(coefficient of variance). In the case of gas oil (diesel), this indicator before minimum taxa-
tion amounts to 0.343 for EU15, 0.389 for EU+10 and 0.424 for EU25. In scenario (a) it is 
remarkably reduced to 0.236 for EU25, in scenario (c) to 0.169 for EU25 and in scenario (b) 
to zero, indicating full harmonization.  
The gross price changes which would be induced by implementing the Directive’s minimum 
(unit) taxes are given in the following tables. These serve as an input to modeling the three 
policy scenarios. The ad valorem tax changes are separated into average industry and house-
hold gross price changes. Table 4 shows the full tax harmonization scenario (FTH) taking into 
account the minimum tax rates for 2004; Member States with current tax rates lower than the 
Directive’s minimum tax need to increase their taxes (positive numbers) while Member States 
with current tax rates higher than the required minimum tax choose to reduce their taxes to the 
minimum level (negative numbers).  
Replacing negative numbers in Table 4 by zeros leads to our scenario of partial harmoniza-
tion: the minimum tax harmonization scenario (MTH). Member States increase their taxes to 
fulfill the minimum taxation set by the Directive and hold their tax rates constant at current 
levels in case they are currently higher than the minimum tax.  
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Table 5 provides the required gross price changes to comply with the 1997 proposal. Since the 
1997 proposal involved stricter rates for all energy products (compare Table 2), all gross 
energy price changes are higher than those required for the actual Directive. We only model 
the partial harmonization for the 1997 proposal. Thus, all Member States with taxes lower 
than the proposal increase their taxes while all other states keep their tax rates constant 
(MTH97). The MTH97 scenario can be derived from the FTH97 scenario in Table 5 by re-
placing all negative numbers with zeros. 
Table 4  
Gross price changes in scenario FTH (full tax harmonization) induced by implementing the 
minimum rates for 2004
* 
FTH     FRA DEU GBR ITA  CZE HUN POL XAC EUS  XEU 
1  col Industry  4.2 2.9 -3.4 9.7 13.6  5.5 9.1 15.6  13.3  -16.9 
    Households  5.3 3.4 4.2  3.8 17.5  8.7 9.3 30.6  -11.2  -11.2 
3 gas  Industry  3.4  -9.3  -3.0  -5.7  3.4  3.0  3.4  4.5  2.9  -1.1 
    Households  3.3 -8.0 3.9 -33.6 5.3 6.0 4.3 10.4 2.9 -10.6 
4 p_c  Industry  -11.8  -17.3  -31.8 -19.5  6.7  -5.5  3.4  8.8  -4.9  -3.6 
   Households  -17.1  -21.9  -35.0 -28.1  2.7  -3.2  -1.9  12.7  -7.2  -12.7 
5  ely Industry  1.3 -5.0  -6.3  -24.6 1.0 0.7 1.0  0.5 -0.7 -3.7 
    Households  -6.6  -12.3  0.9 -26.0 1.5 1.2 1.4  1.2 -0.6 -16.8 
*Scenario MTH can be derived by replacing all negative numbers with zeros. 
 
Table 5  
Gross price changes in scenario FTH97 
     FRA DEU GBR ITA  CZE HUN POL XAC EUS XEU 
1  col  Industry  19.6 13.7 24.1 45.4 63.3 25.6 42.6 72.7 61.9 10.4 
    Households  12.5  7.9  9.8  8.8  40.9 20.4 21.6 71.3 -6.9 -6.9 
3  gas  Industry  16.1  2.0  12.3  9.3  15.9 14.0 16.0 20.8 13.7 13.7 
    Households  7.6  -3.2  9.1 -30.2 12.3 13.9 10.0 24.2  6.7  -5.4 
4  p_c  Industry  0  -6.1 -24.5 -8.9 20.7  7.5  15.5 23.1  6.3  8.2 
    Households  -4.8 -10.4  -22.4  -15.9 22.4 14.5 15.9 35.3  8.0  0.9 
5  ely Industry  7.7  -0.2  -1.8  -22.5  5.7 4.4 5.8 5.5 4.0 1.4 
    Households  -4.5  -10.9  2.8  -24.7  4.5 3.7 4.1 4.3 1.4  -14.9 
*Scenario MTH97 can be derived by replacing all negative numbers with zeros. 
3.4  Recycling of Tax Revenues 
The way in which the additional tax revenue is used is important for the effects of energy 
taxes. In the discussion about energy taxation, the “double dividend” issue has played a 
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prominent role.8 This issue, however, is not the focus of the current paper, mainly for two 
reasons. Firstly, the Directive does not contain any prescriptions about the tax recycling. The 
earlier 1997 proposal much more specifically instructed countries to follow the twofold goal 
of greater protection of the environment and increased employment, and thus to use the addi-
tional tax revenue to reduce labor costs. In regard of the different economic, fiscal and labor 
market situations within the EU Member States, all assumptions about tax recycling in light 
of the current Directive would have to be rather arbitrary. Secondly, the double dividend de-
bate in Europe has been dominated by the issue of a reduction of labor costs and its effects on 
unemployment. However, since the GTAP data base lacks information on labor and capital 
income tax this aspect cannot be dealt with properly in this framework. For these reasons, the 
standard closure of GTAP-E was used which allocates the additional tax revenue to govern-
ment spending, private consumption and private savings in the same proportions as total 
spending in the initial situation. 
 
4  Analysis of the Energy Tax Policy Scenarios  
The results of the simulations will be discussed in three blocks: the effects on energy and CO2 
emissions, the macroeconomic impacts and the influence on structural change and interna-
tional trade. 
Energy Prices, Energy Demand and CO2 Emissions 
The primary impulse of the Directive is on energy prices and demand. Energy price changes 
do not necessarily reflect the exact tax modification, because the induced adjustment of en-
ergy demand influences the market prices for energy (including the import prices of energy).  
In general, energy demand follows changes in energy gross prices due to in- or decreased 
taxes (compare Table 6). In the MTH scenario, energy demand does not change much in the 
old Member States. In most cases, the change in demand is well below 1  %, except for gas 
demand in France, Great Britain and the Southern European Countries, where due to an in-
crease in gas taxes demand decreases between 2 and 3  %. In the new Member States, the pic-
ture is somewhat different although the changes in energy demand are still rather limited. All 
new Member States apart from Hungary have to increase their energy taxes, in particular 
                                                                          
8 Cf. footnote 3. 
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those for natural gas and petroleum products (compare Table 4). In the Czech Republic, for 
example, compliance with the Directive leads to a price increase of 3 to 5 %. In the rest of the 
new Member states, gas demand decreases by about 2  % and demand for petroleum products 
by up to almost 6 %. In spite of a small increase of electricity taxes in the new Member States, 
electricity demand increases slightly. This can be explained by the substantially higher tax 
increase for fossil fuels which leads to a substitution towards electricity. 
In the FTH scenario, the four largest of the old Member States reduce most of their energy 
taxes (see Table 5). Therefore, in particular in Italy, the demand for gas, petroleum products 
and electricity rises between 17 and 21%. In Great Britain, the demand for petroleum products 
even rises by about 33%, in France and Germany by 13 and 18  % respectively. As energy 
taxes in the Southern European Countries are more or less at the level of the Directive, the 
FTH scenario reveals minor effects for theses countries. The changes in energy demand range 
from -2 to +3%. For the new Member States the changes in energy demand are quite similar 
to the MTH scenario. However, the decrease in demand for petroleum products is slightly 
stronger despite the same changes in energy taxes as in the MTH scenario. This can be ex-
plained inter alia by higher world market prices for petroleum products due to increased de-
mand in the other European Member States. 
Table 6  
Change of total demand of energy goods in volume (%) 
  FRA DEU GBR  ITA CZE HUN POL XAC EUS XEU  XOECD ROW
FTH      
  col 0.39  1.97 0.05  12.48 -0.39 -0.83 -1.59 -2.03 -0.48 6.43  -0.13 -0.22
  gas -3.76  5.51 -3.02  14.61 -1.89 -2.11 -2.28 -1.91 -2.25 3.35  0.24 0.24
  p_c 12.88  17.78 32.85  20.27 -4.99 1.84 -2.31 -6.93 2.61 4.38  -1.40 -1.20
  ely 0.65  4.05 -0.94  19.80 0.66 -0.83 0.06 0.44 0.10 6.35  0.09 -0.09
MTH      
  col -0.98  -0.15 -0.28  -1.22 -1.62 -0.45 -1.25 -2.10 -0.53 0.14  0.04 0.05
  gas -2.64 0 -1.23  -0.01 -2.27 -1.95 -2.24 -2.10 -1.91 0.03  0 0.02
  p_c 0.08  0.02 0.02  0.02 -3.45 0.04 -1.36 -5.63 0.01 0.02  0.02 0.01
  ely -0.43  0.03 -0.24  0.03 0.22 -0.38 0.19 0.39 0.05 0.02 0 0.01
MTH97      
  col -4.56  -0.54 -1.66  -5.14 -6.54 -2.32 -5.04 -8.41 -3.63 -0.76  0.19 0.25
  gas -9.01  -0.53 -5.79  -3.12 -8.94 -6.59 -8.08 -8.91 -7.30 -4.20  0.01 0.09
  p_c 0.53  0.25 0.23  0.27 -11.89 -5.23 -8.40 -13.36 -4.37 -3.57  0.19 0.15
  ely -2.63  0.15 -0.34  0.51 -0.36 -1.59 -0.11 -0.85 -1.32 0.51 0 0.08
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In the MTH97 scenario, all Member States have to increase their energy taxes. The only ex-
ceptions are taxes for petroleum products in France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy and 
electricity taxes in Germany and Italy which are currently above the thresholds. In general, 
the changes in energy demand in the old and the new Member States are more balanced than 
in the other two scenarios. Gas consumption reduces by 3 to 9  %. Only in Germany, gas de-
mand would hardly change. Demand for petroleum products decreases between 5 and 13 % in 
the new Member States and between 3 and 4  % in the southern and the remaining Member 
States (EUS & XEU). The effect on electricity demand is rather limited at less than 1 % in all 
Member States, except for France, Hungary and the Southern European Member States, 
where the electricity demand will decrease by 1 to 3 %. 
Energy demand in the rest of the world (XOECD & ROW) is hardly affected in all three sce-
narios. The changes in the demand for the individual products are substantially below 1  %. 
Only in the FTH scenario, the substantial increase of demand for petroleum products in the 
old Member States leads to decreasing demand for theses products in the rest of the world (-1 
to –1,5 %). 
The effect on CO2 emissions is quite remarkable for some countries (see Table 7). In the FTH 
scenario, CO2 emissions increase in the old Member States and decrease in the new Member 
States. CO2 emissions in the Great Britain and Italy, for example, increase by more than 15%. 
In contrast, the other two scenarios (MTH, MTH97) result in decreasing CO2 emissions for all 
Member States. Obviously, the contribution to climate protection is much stronger in the 
MTH97 scenario than in the MTH scenario. In the new and Southern Member States, the 
latter scenario decreases CO2 emissions by 5 to 11  %. In the other Member States, the effect 
would be somewhat smaller but in most countries still important. 
Table 7  
Change of emissions by region (%) 
 FRA DEU  GBR  ITA CZE HUN POL XAC EUS XEU  XOECD  ROW
  FTH 4.87 9.43  16.66  15.65 -2.87 -0.41 -1.69 -3.11 1.04 4.31  -0.70  -0.46
  MTH -1.11 -0.04  -0.14  -0.11 -3.23 -0.81 -1.38 -2.99 -0.72 0.04  0.02  0
  MTH97 -4.12 -0.32  -0.72  -1.53 -11.17 -4.42 -5.30 -8.78 -6.12 -3.26 0.15  0.04
 
Emissions leakage from the EU to the rest of the world (ROW) can be observed for emissions 
from all energy products except for gas in the MTH scenario. CO2 emissions in the EU25 as a 
whole decrease while they slightly increase in the rest of OECD (XOECD) and ROW. The 
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latter includes the group of oil exporting countries. The leakage is highest for crude oil and 
petroleum product related emissions. In the FTH scenario, the opposite effect – a negative 
leakage - can be observed. CO2 emissions increase for the EU25 as a whole while they de-
crease for the ROW, again with the exception of gas. 
 
4.1 Macroeconomic  Effects 
Table 8 reports the effect on real GDP. Within the general equilibrium framework of GTAP-E 
all factors of production are assumed to be fully employed. Furthermore, in the current simu-
lations, there are no changes of factor endowment or technological parameters. Therefore, an 
increase of GDP must be due to either a reduction of distortions (e.g. from the tax system) in 
the economy or an improvement of terms of trade.  
Table 8  
Change of real GDP and of Terms of Trade (%) 
  1.1.1.1.1.1 Chang
e of real GDP 
1.1.1.1.1.3 Change 
of Terms of Trade 
 FTH MTH  MTH97 FTH MTH MTH97
FRA  0.56 0.00  0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.03
DEU  0.57 0.00  0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.02
GBR  0.87 0.00  0.00 0.17 0.00 -0.03
ITA  0.87 0.00  0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.02
CZE  -0.19 -0.13  -0.58 -0.14 -0.10 -0.35
HUN  0.12 -0.01  -0.44 -0.03 0.00 -0.02
POL  -0.11 -0.06  -0.40 -0.17 -0.06 -0.24
XAC  -0.22 -0.18  -0.57 0.07 0.03 0.00
EUS  0.13 0.00  -0.24 -0.15 0.00 -0.04
XEU  0.23 0.00  -0.18 -0.03 0.00 0.03
XOECD  -0.02 0.00  0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.04
ROW  -0.01 0.00  0.00 0.26 -0.01 -0.04
 
In the MTH scenario, which involves tax increases in some countries but no tax reductions, 
the effects on GDP are very small. They are slightly negative for those countries which need 
to substantially increase their energy taxes, namely the accession countries. The increase in 
energy taxes induces a reduction of energy use and thus a reduction of the productivity of the 
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other factors of production. The scenario MTH97 displays a similar pattern, but in general the 
values are larger due to the fact that the required tax increases are higher in MTH97. 
In the scenario of full tax harmonization (FTH) some countries substantially reduce their 
energy tax rates (especially Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the rest of the EU), whereas the 
tax increases are the same as in the scenario MTH. This produces an increase in GDP between 
0,5% and almost 1% for the countries with tax reductions. It is interesting to note that two 
countries, France and Hungary, which only reduce the tax rates on petroleum products, also 
experience an increase in GDP. In the case of France, the increase is almost as large as for 
Germany which reduces taxes for almost all energy products. For the other countries, the 
negative effect on GDP is higher compared to MTH. This can be explained by the increase in 
energy demand in the countries with tax reductions and of the European Union as a whole 
which leads to increasing world energy prices. Therefore, a deterioration of the terms-of-trade 
can be observed for all EU countries with exception of Great Britain which is an oil exporter 
itself. 
The energy price increase also affects the rest of the OECD and the rest of the world which 
now display slightly negative effects on GDP. This effect is less pronounced for the rest of the 
world than for the OECD, since the former group comprises the oil-exporting countries which 
now profit from a positive terms-of-trade effect. 
Table 9  
Effect on the balance of trade (% of GDP)  
  FTH MTH  MTH97 
FRA -0.08%  0.02%  0.07% 
DEU  -0.37% 0.00% -0.04% 
GBR  -0.81% 0.00% 0.00% 
ITA  -0.52% 0.00% -0.01% 
CZE  0.82% 0.55% 1.92% 
HUN  0.00% 0.05% 0.64% 
POL  0.38% 0.17% 0.76% 
XAC  0.66% 0.44% 1.55% 
EUS  0.02% 0.00% 0.24% 
XEU  -0.08% 0.00% 0.26% 
XOECD  0.11% 0.00% -0.04% 
ROW  0.13% 0.00% -0.04% 
 
The effect on the trade balance (Table 9) must be interpreted taking account of the macroeco-
nomic identity  
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trade balance (i.e. export – imports) = savings – investment 
and the closure of GTAP-E used for these simulations. Whereas savings are an (almost) con-
stant share of regional income, investment depends on the (current) rate of return on capital in 
the applied closure.9 With an increase of energy prices the rate of return on capital, a com-
plementary factor of production, and thus investment drops. This leads to a surplus of the 
trade balance if savings do not over-compensate this change. Therefore, an improvement of 
the trade balance can be observed for those countries which substantially increase energy 
prices. In the scenario FTH, the trade balance deteriorates in those EU countries which reduce 
energy taxes.  
 
4.2 Structural  Effects 
The analysis of structural production effects supports the results on changes in energy prices, 
energy demand and real GDP. Sectoral output behaves in accordance with the changes in 
energy price and energy demand. Consequently, the largest effects can be observed for energy 
producing and energy intensive sectors in those countries where tax changes are most pro-
nounced. To illustrate the effect on sectoral output, it seems interesting to build three country 
clusters: 1) A group of countries with large effects: Czech Republic and the rest of accession 
countries (XAC), 2) a group of countries with middle range effects: France and Hungary, and 
3) a group of countries with small effects: Germany and Italy. The countries in group 1 need 
to increase taxes for all energy products. This leads to substantial decreases in sectoral output 
for gas and petroleum products as well as energy intensive industries. Being at comparative 
advantage in terms of relative input prices, non-energy intensive industries raise their produc-
tion, as does the electricity industry. The latter effect is due to significantly lower tax in-
creases for electricity than for the other energy products. The effects are the same for all three 
scenarios, though they are much more pronounced in the MTH and in particular in the 
MTH97 scenario.  
                                                                          
9 In this closure an increase of the (current) rate of return in one country attracts a higher share of global invest-
ment to this region. This effect is mitigated by the assumption that higher investment brings down the expected 
rate of return. 
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Group 2 (France, Hungary) needs to raise taxes for all energy inputs except for petroleum 
products. This leads to a rather different effect on sectoral output than for group 1. In the FTH 
scenario both countries show a shift towards petroleum products as taxes in this sector de-
crease. This induces a rise in crude oil production. The remaining sectors by and large stay 
about the same, even though gas and electricity taxes need to be raised. The overall effect on 
real GDP is positive. The driving effect of the petroleum product sector is eliminated in the 
MTH scenario. For this reason, both countries show negligible effects on sectoral output with 
the exception of gas and electricity output where a more pronounced tax adjustment is re-
quired and thus output decreases.  
Group 3 includes those countries where no tax increase other than for coal input is required: 
Germany and Italy. The effects on sectoral output are small in the MTH scenario. For the 
FTH scenario, an increase in output of all tax-decrease energy producing sectors other than 
coal – which suffers a higher tax - can be observed. Energy intensive industries report a 
higher output. For the MTH97 scenario, taxes will need to be increased for gas input to indus-
try in addition to coal. Consequently, a decrease in gas production can be observed.  
4.3 International  Trade  Effects 
Whereas the level of the balance of trade is determined by the macroeconomic links the struc-
ture of imports and exports is mainly determined by the relative prices of the commodities.10  
The change of the patterns of exports and imports can be described by the indicator of re-
vealed comparative advantage (RCA). This is calculated by dividing the export-import ratio at 
the sectoral level by the overall export-import ratio. Transformed into logarithms a value 
above zero identifies an industry which has an export-import ratio above average indicating a 
comparative advantage, a value below zero indicating a comparative disadvantage.  
Analogously, the changes of the export-import ratio at the sectoral level compared with the 
changes of the total export-import ratio can be used to describe the changes in the pattern of 
comparative advantage (see Table 10). A positive value indicates an improvement of the 
comparative advantage position of the industry, a negative value indicates a deterioration. 
                                                                          
10 Additionally, income changes in countries with different patterns of demand can contribute to changes. 
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In scenario MTH and (even more pronounced) in MTH97, in accession countries the relative 
position of energy sectors in foreign trade is improved due to lower imports (exception is gas 
in CZE), in manufacturing the comparative advantage shifts from the energy-intensive sectors 
(MIN, MET and OEIM) to the non energy-intensive sectors (M_E and TCL), and transporta-
tion is losing while services is gaining comparative advantage. The changes in EUS show a 
similar picture. The opposite changes in general occur in the traditional EU countries which 
tend to gain comparative advantage in energy-intensive sectors and to lose in non energy-
intensive sectors.  
As may be expected, this pattern is more pronounced in scenario FTH. As a paradoxical result 
we find here an increase in comparative advantage in labor-intensive, non energy-intensive 
TCL for the traditional EU countries, which is due to an interaction of changes in relative 
factor prices and demand.  
The pattern of comparative advantage in non EU countries shifts from energy commodities  to 
manufacturing industries in the energy-saving scenarios MTH and MTH97, while the changes 
are in the opposite direction in the more energy-consuming scenario FTH.   
 
Table 10  
Change in RCA (revealed comparative advantage) 
MTH AGR COL Oil  Gas p_c ely TCL M_E MIN MET OEIM  T_T SERV  CGDS
FRA 0.0 4.1 -0.2  3.3 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2  0.1 0.1  -0.1
DEU 0.0 -0.1 0.0  -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
GBR 0.0 0.7 0.0  0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
ITA 0.0 1.2 -0.1  -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
CZE 0.6 3.3 4.3  -21.7 2.8 1.6 0.2 0.1 -2.0 -1.0 0.5  -0.4 1.5  -1.0
HUN -0.1 1.9 0.4  1.9 -0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8  0.1 0.1  -0.1
POL -0.5 6.6 2.5  2.4 1.0 2.0 0.1 0.3 -1.4 -1.4 0.0  -0.1 0.7  -0.5
XAC -0.4 5.4 3.1  2.9 4.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 -3.9 -1.1 -0.3  -0.4 1.1  -0.5
EUS 0.0 1.9 -0.1  3.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
XEU 0.0 -0.6 0.1  -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
XOECD 0.0 -0.3 0.0  -0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
ROW 0.0 -0.5 0.0  -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0
 
FTH AGR COL Oil Gas  p_c ely TCL M_E MIN MET OEIM  T_T  SERV CGDS
FRA 0.8 2.6 -8.5 6.6  -10.9 8.4 0.1 -0.1 1.1 -0.5 -0.4  1.4  -0.5 0.2
DEU -0.1 -14.1 -11.4 -6.6  -13.8 -3.0 0.7 -0.2 3.8 1.1 0.9 1.6  -1.1 1.3
GBR 0.0 3.5 -37.5 -2.3  -20.7 -0.5 5.1 -2.0 8.4 0.5 -0.9  4.9  -3.2 3.2
ITA 1.8 -11.4 -19.9 -14.1  -14.5 -24.2 1.2 0.0 6.4 4.3 3.6  -0.1  -2.9 2.1
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CZE 0.9 0.2 10.6 -22.1  8.2 12.1 0.3 0.3 -4.4 -1.4 0.6  -1.1  2.7 -1.5
HUN 0.2 4.1 5.8 5.0  0.6 4.1 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.7 -1.0  0.0  -0.1 0.0
POL -0.8 9.0 10.6 5.6  6.7 2.6 0.1 1.3 -3.9 -1.9 -0.2  -0.8  1.7 -1.3
XAC -0.5 6.5 2.9 5.4  10.4 3.5 -0.1 1.3 -6.4 -1.6 -0.6  -1.1  2.0 -0.8
EUS 0.2 4.9 0.1 9.9  -0.6 2.7 -0.2 0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.0  0.0  0.4 -0.2
XEU 0.4 -14.7 -4.0 -1.3  4.6 -1.4 0.3 0.2 -0.6 0.7 0.7  -0.2  0.3 0.1
XOECD -0.3 0.3 6.3 1.0  2.2 3.8 -0.3 0.2 -2.1 -0.4 -0.5  -0.7 1.0 -0.9
ROW -0.3 1.3 3.4 0.6  1.9 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -1.8 -0.7 -0.4  -0.7  0.5 -0.2
 
MTH97 AGR COL Oil Gas  p_c ely TCL M_E MIN MET OEIM  T_T SERV  CGDS
FRA -0.1 17.7 -1.4 11.3  -1.3 3.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 -1.0 -0.9  0.5 0.1  -0.3
DEU 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -2.4  -1.3 -1.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 0.3 -0.1  0.2 -0.3  0.2
GBR 0.0 5.9 0.4 -2.0  -2.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1  0.3 -0.2  0.0
ITA 0.0 4.3 -1.1 1.7  -1.1 -1.8 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.2  0.3 -0.2  0.1
CZE 2.1 11.0 13.5 -95.4  6.7 6.4 0.1 0.2 -5.7 -4.3 1.2  -0.3 5.0  -3.6
HUN -1.3 7.8 8.6 5.9  1.4 2.8 0.7 0.7 -5.2 -2.4 -3.8  -0.2 1.9  -1.1
POL -2.2 24.6 14.1 7.9  5.8 8.2 0.3 1.1 -5.8 -6.2 0.0  -0.3 2.8  -2.4
XAC -1.0 21.2 7.9 10.4  7.2 5.4 0.3 2.6 -11.4 -5.2 -1.5  -0.2 3.7  -2.1
EUS 0.0 13.0 5.0 3.1  2.7 2.6 0.3 0.3 -3.0 -2.0 -0.9  -0.3 1.0  -0.9
XEU -0.4 0.0 1.9 7.1  2.4 0.6 -0.1 0.6 -1.7 -0.2 0.0  -1.1 1.1  -0.5
XOECD 0.1 -1.3 -0.5 -2.3  -0.4 -1.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.4  0.3
ROW 0.1 -2.2 -0.3 -2.6  -0.4 -1.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1  0.1 -0.3  0.1
 
5  Summary and Conclusions  
With the new Directive on Energy Taxation, the European Union intends to reduce existing 
distortions of competition between Member States and energy products as a result of diver-
gent rates of tax on energy products. Moreover, it wants to increase incentives to use energy 
more efficiently and to cut carbon dioxide emissions. The Directive (as well as previous pro-
posals for a CO2/energy tax) has been subject to controversial debates, because most member 
states were afraid that higher energy taxation may have adverse effects on their economy. As 
a result, the Directive is far less stringent than previous proposals and includes a number of 
general and Member specific exemptions and transitional periods. 
This paper analyzed the effects of the Directive and of a previous proposal for such a Direc-
tive (1997 proposal) on the economy, on energy use and related CO2 emissions. In order to 
account for the ambiguity that results from minimum tax rates, which are substantially lower 
than existing tax rates in many Member States, alternative scenarios were developed, assum-
ing full tax harmonization at the minimum level on the one hand and partial harmonization 
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(without reduction of currently higher tax rates) on the other hand. The results can be summa-
rized as follows: 
In the case of partial tax harmonization, the Directive induces reductions of energy demand 
and CO2 emissions. These go along with some GDP losses, especially in the accession coun-
tries, while in the other countries the effects are negligible. The scenario of full tax harmoni-
zation shows that the current directive would not contribute to overall energy savings and CO2 
reductions if the traditional Member States were not willing to accept tax differentials in the 
future. In the case of full tax harmonization, those countries could increase their GDP at the 
expense of the new Members. This implies that energy taxes would have to be harmonized on 
a higher level if the double objective of a reduction of distortions and a reduction of energy 
use and related emissions are to be pursued in the future. 
A partial tax harmonization following the minimum tax level suggested by the 1997 proposal 
would have brought about much larger reductions in energy demand and subsequent CO2 
emissions than the current proposal. Consequently, the energy efficiency and environmental 
goals of the Directive would have come closer to be met. At the same time, the economic 
effects of the proposal for the old EU Member States would have been small to even positive 
for some States. For the accession countries, however, the economic effects would have been 
more pronounced. Larger negative effects on GDP may have resulted. 
By and large, a EU Tax Harmonization is likely to entail some costs for the new Member 
States. This will, however, not necessarily mean a welfare loss to the new members. On the 
one hand, they may profit from welfare gains from the EU membership, on the other hand 
from an improved environment. Moreover, accession countries receive support from the 
European Union to adjust to community framework and to catch up with the old Member 
States. 
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